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Abstract. Research on belief formation has produced contradictory findings on whether and when 
communication between group members will improve the accuracy of numeric estimates such as 
economic forecasts, medical diagnoses, and job candidate assessments. While some evidence 
suggests that carefully mediated processes such as the “Delphi method” produce more accurate 
beliefs than unstructured discussion, others argue that unstructured discussion outperforms 
mediated processes. Still others argue that independent individuals produce the most accurate 
beliefs. This paper shows how network theories of belief formation can resolve these 
inconsistencies, even when groups lack apparent structure as in informal conversation. Emergent 
network structures of influence interact with the pre-discussion belief distribution to moderate the 
effect of communication on belief formation. As a result, communication sometimes increases and 
sometimes decreases the accuracy of the average belief in a group. The effects differ for mediated 
processes and unstructured communication, such that the relative benefit of each communication 
format depends on both group dynamics as well as the statistical properties of pre-interaction 
beliefs. These results resolve contradictions in previous research and offer practical 
recommendations for teams and organizations. 
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The fundamental paradox in group decision-making is that interaction between group members is 
often an integral part of the decision-making process, and yet social influence dynamics pose the 
risk of undermining decision quality through processes such as herding (Da & Huang, 2019; 
Lorenz et al., 2011) and groupthink (Janis, 1982; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). As a result, a great 
deal of research has sought to understand why group decision-making sometimes fails (Janis, 
1982) and what practices, if any, can allow interacting groups to produce accurate beliefs (Green 
et al., 2007). However, despite decades of interest, researchers have offered only contradictory 
answers on whether and how social influence impacts belief accuracy. 
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One critical question is how to mitigate the risks associated with unstructured, free-flowing 
conversation such as conformity pressure and overly domineering discussants (Dalkey, 1969). 
These concerns motivated the development of the “Delphi method” (Dalkey, 1969) and other 
strategies for mediating communication through controlled processes (Gustafson et al., 1973; Ven 
& Delbecq, 1974). While techniques varied across implementation, they all generally allowed 
people to communicate information indirectly, e.g. by writing numbers down on a piece of paper. 
As an experimental paradigm, this process offers a very simple design: first collect independent 
pre-communication estimates; then after some mediated process such as the exchange of numeric 
estimates, collect post-communication estimates. Researchers then pose a simple question: does 
the group become more accurate? And, additionally, which process produces the greatest 
increase/decrease in accuracy? However, only a relatively small number of experiments employed 
questions that could be objectively verified for accuracy. Moreover, these few experiments yielded 
conflicting results on whether such controlled, numeric communication offers any benefit over 
unstructured discussion or whether either process improved accuracy at all (Hastie, 1986). 
 We resolve these contradictory results by showing how network theories of belief 
formation developed in research on “collective intelligence” 1  can explain why unstructured 
discussion will sometimes outperform numeric communication and why the outcome is sometimes 
reversed. In particular, we draw on two key observations. First, Becker et al (2017) demonstrated 
that the potential benefit or risk of social influence depends on the network structure of 
communication. In particular, they reported that decentralized networks where everyone is equally 
connected reliably improve belief accuracy, while centralized networks risk undermining the 
wisdom of crowds. However, Almaatouq et al. (2020) challenged this claim, showing that the 
effect and potential risk of influence network centralization depends on the statistical properties of 
 
 
1 There is no single definition of collective intelligence, though a common one is the broad notion of “collectives 
acting intelligently” (Malone & Bernstein, 2015). For our context, the most relevant idea is that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, and that groups can be collectively rational even when composed of irrational individuals 
(Krafft et al., 2016).  
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the pre-interaction belief distribution. As we note in both our analysis and our discussion, it is 
important when assessing the effects of social influence to distinguish between communication 
networks—i.e., binary networks that define who can communicate with whom—and influence 
networks, in which the tie between two people is represented as a weighted value between zero 
and one. 
Our key insight is the observation that unstructured discussion, which can be influenced 
disproportionately by domineering individuals (Dalkey 1969), can be modeled as a centralized 
influence network. Because numeric communication eliminates the possibility of any variation in 
persuasive influence, the Delphi method and other mediated communication techniques can be 
modeled as a relatively decentralized network. We show that in this context, the results developed 
by Almaatouq et al. (2020) can be approximated with a simple heuristic: when a majority of 
individuals are more accurate than the group, unstructured discussion is most likely to improve 
accuracy; when a majority are less accurate, numeric communication is superior. As we discuss, 
however, this behavior is distinct from other majority-driven dynamics such as the risky shift 
(Stoner, 1961) and group polarization (Myers & Bishop, 1971; Myers & Lamm, 1976). 
Specifically, those models assume that any given group is drawn towards the majority opinion, 
whereas we find this result only on average across many groups. We demonstrate this hypothesis 
with a re-analysis of previous experimental data as well as a novel, pre-registered experimental 
dataset that replicates these findings with a new population, new design, and systematically 
sampled question set. 
The primary contribution of this paper is to resolve contradictions in previous research 
about a question that is fundamental to understanding team behavior and organizational 
performance: how does communication impact belief accuracy? Our findings also show how a 
network theoretical framework can help us to understand belief formation in otherwise 
unstructured (in a network sense) communication, including the Delphi method and also everyday 
interactions such as committee meetings. These dynamics are driven by emergent networks of 
influence which impact the behavior of both numeric exchange and informal discussion beyond 
the initial determination of who communicates with whom. The primary implication is that 
unstructured discussion, like centralized networks, may be considered unreliable under wide range 
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of conditions. In the conclusion of this paper, we describe how this network theoretical framework 
reveals possible solutions that allow groups to engage in free-form discussion while mitigating the 
risks associated with centralized influence. 
 
 
DECISIONS AND BELIEF ACCURACY 
Broadly speaking, decision-making is a complex behavior that involves many distinct processes 
such as idea generation, idea evaluation, and idea selection (Davis, 1973). Each of these individual 
processes has been the subject of extensive research. For example, idea generation has been studied 
through research on brainstorming (Stroebe et al., 2010) and is subject to unique concerns such as 
the exploration-exploitation tradeoff (Lazer & Friedman, 2007; March, 1991). The present paper 
focuses specifically on the formation of accurate beliefs, which is important to idea evaluation—
e.g., assessing the expected payoff of an investment. As a basic process, belief formation plays a 
fundamental role in many kinds of decision-making. 
Although decision-making can be a complex process that involves the synthesis of many 
different sources and types of information, accurate numeric estimates are one common form of 
belief critical to many kinds of decisions. One of the most widely studied estimation tasks is 
forecasting (Atanasov et al. 2017, Dalkey and Helmer 1963, Jansen et al. 2016), which is a critical 
component of strategic decision-making and can include forecasting business metrics like revenue 
(Da and Huang 2019) and sales (Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015), predicting the success of an 
advertising campaign (Hartnett, Kennedy, Sharp, & Greenacre, 2016), or estimating future macro-
economic indicators (Jansen, Jin, & de Winter, 2016). One particularly widely studied form of 
forecasting is software development effort, i.e. how much it will cost to develop a new project 
(Jørgensen, 2004). In one case study, Cyert and March (1963) describe a construction firm for 
whom expectations of future business volume played a central role in the decision to move 
operations to a new location.  
Although formal models may often be available to support forecasting and estimation, 
subjective or “gut” estimates remain a central source of predictions in both strategic arenas such 
as economic forecasting (Jansen et al., 2016) as well as operational decisions such as software 
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development (Jørgensen, 2004). One reason subjective estimates remain important is because 
statistical models are limited in their ability to handle new contexts, and thus subjective estimates 
tend to outperform statistical models in unfamiliar contexts such as crises—precisely those times 
when it is most important to reduce uncertainty (Jørgensen, 2004). While people don’t always 
quantify important decisions in practice, the goal of the present research is to develop prescriptive 
theories about how we should make decisions. This endeavor is thus similar to the prescription for 
individuals to develop quantified scoresheets for important decisions [Bazerman and Moore 1994] 
or to engage in debiasing interventions.  
Numeric estimates can play a role in even in decisions where there is not an obviously 
“correct” choice, such as hiring. Hiring ideally involves predicting in advance how candidates will 
later be measured on such factors as performance, cultural fit, and likelihood of remaining 
employed. While many important employee characteristics are subjective, employees at lower 
levels of organizations are frequently evaluated with explicitly quantified metrics. Industries such 
as customer service call centers have a long history of quantifying employee productivity with 
metrics such as quality assurance scores and upsell rates (Holman et al. 2002). More recent 
advances in monitoring technology are allowing performance quantification for employees as 
varied as restaurant waitstaff (Pierce et al. 2015) and warehouse workers (Moore 2019). In 
scenarios where employees are evaluated on a quantitative metric, as is common in customer 
service call centers, hiring a person is tantamount to forecasting that they will have a high 
performance score. 
   
To group or not to group? 
While these decisions certainly can (and often are) made by individuals, groups play an 
increasingly important role in decisions that were once dominated by individuals, such as medical 
decision-making (Christensen et al., 2003) and even hedge fund management (Massa et al., 2006). 
Importantly, the rise of teams offers enormous potential benefit—indeed, the core motivation of 
“collective intelligence” theory (Da & Huang, 2019; Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Weick & Roberts, 
1993; Woolley et al., 2010) is that groups can produce better (e.g., more accurate) decisions than 
individuals (Krafft et al., 2016; Sunstein, 2006; Weick & Roberts, 1993). For example, studies on 
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belief accuracy have found that the aggregated beliefs of multiple physicians can outperform even 
the most skilled individuals (Kurvers et al., 2016), and that aggregate beliefs of amateur investors 
can outperform expert analysts (Chen et al., 2014; Drogen & Jha, 2013). 
One key argument for the accuracy benefits of groups over individuals is the expectation 
that that no single individual is likely to provide an exactly correct numeric estimate. Both 
statistical principles (Hogarth, 1978; Page, 2007) and empirical data (Atanasov et al., 2017; 
Galton, 1907; Ven & Delbecq, 1974) suggest that when group members pool their beliefs, errors 
cancel out in aggregate, allowing groups to generate more accurate beliefs (and thus produce better 
decisions) than individuals acting in isolation. In fact, the “crowd beats average” principle (Page, 
2007)—commonly known as the “variance bias decomposition” in statistical estimation theory—
provides a mathematical guarantee that the average belief in a group will be more accurate (in 
terms of squared error) than a randomly selected individual. The intuitive interpretation of these 
principles is that when people have diverse information and perspectives, errors “cancel out” and 
produce accurate group beliefs. 
However, groups in practice often fail to take advantage of all the diversity of information 
held by their individual members. Some examples of how group decision-making can fail emerge 
from case studies describing “Groupthink” dynamics (Janis, 1982) in organizational decisions. In 
these studies, norms favoring group cohesion produced conformity pressures which prevented 
individuals from sharing information that contradicted existing group beliefs (Janis, 1982; 
Surowiecki, 2004). Importantly, social influence can harm belief accuracy even in the absence of 
normative pressure. Herding models have shown that strictly rational individuals who would 
produce accurate decisions independently can produce inaccurate decisions when their beliefs are 
formed sequentially (Banerjee, 1992). This process has been shown empirically to impact financial 
crowdsourcing. For example, early versions of Estimize allowed contributors to see the estimates 
of other forecasters before providing their own forecast, reducing overall accuracy; when they 
revised their design to require independent contributions, accuracy increased (Da & Huang, 2019).  
One especially popular strategy for taking advantage of a group’s collected intelligence 
while minimizing the risks associated with social influence is the “wisdom of crowds” approach 
(Atanasov et al., 2017; Da & Huang, 2019; Golub & Jackson, 2010; Lamberson & Page, 2012; 
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Minson et al., 2018; Mollick & Nanda, 2016). This approach is simple and yet powerful: simply 
collect the independent beliefs of a large number of individuals, thus harnessing the statistical 
benefits of group beliefs without exposing the decision to the risks of herding or groupthink. This 
approach is reflected in the Estimize platform (Drogen & Jha, 2013) as well as other crowdsourcing 
efforts by firms such as Google (Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015), Ford (Cowgill & Zitzewitz, 2015), 
Dell (Bayus, 2013), and Best Buy (Dvorak, 2008). More advanced statistical methods can improve 
upon simple aggregation by employing weighting methods that, for example, try to identify people 
who are consistently more accurate (Budescu & Chen, 2014). 
However, while the wisdom of crowds strategy can be extremely effective, it is limited in 
two respects. First, it may be infeasible or undesirable to prevent contributors from interacting, as 
when a decision must be made by people who naturally interact in the course of their work and 
information sharing is unavoidable. In such a context, a process which requires independence may 
violate the norms or expectations of the organization in question. Second, even if social interaction 
is potentially avoidable, strategies that harness only the “collected” intelligence of independent 
individuals fail to take advantage of the potential benefits of group interaction, i.e. “collective” 
intelligence. In particular, prior research suggests that properly structured communication 
processes may allow groups to produce even more accurate beliefs than could be obtained by 
independent individuals (Becker et al., 2017; Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Gustafson et al., 1973; Ven 
& Delbecq, 1974).  The key element of these processes is that people do not communicate directly 
via informal conversation, but instead their communication is mediated through some intervening 
process such as a survey. 
 
Mediated Communication 
Motivated by the potential benefits of group interaction, Dalkey developed the “Delphi” method 
as a process that can theoretically harness the collective intelligence2 of interacting groups while 
mitigating the risks associated with social influence dynamics (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). Although 
 
 
2 Though the phrase “collective intelligence” has been introduced relatively recently, the spirit is the same. 
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the exact method varies widely across implementations (Green et al., 2007; Humphrey-Murto & 
de Wit, 2019), the Delphi method generally involves allowing decision-makers to share limited 
information indirectly—mediated by a person or process. Some versions allow participants to write 
down motivating arguments, while others are limited to the exchange of numeric estimates. E.g., 
the Delphi method might proceed as follows: a survey collects participants’ independent estimates; 
a facilitator calculates the mean, median, and inner-quartile and distributes that information to the 
participants; participants then submit final estimates via survey. In laboratory studies utilizing such 
methods, researchers have studied topics ranging from the trivial, such as guessing average 
height/weight ratios (Gustafson et al., 1973) to the more serious, such as optimizing military 
campaigns (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). However, most experiments utilizing the Delphi do enable 
accuracy measurement (e.g. by using questions with no known true answer) and their focus is on 
other factors such as consensus formation (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963) and the perceived ability to 
contribute diverse perspectives without repercussion (Ven & Delbecq, 1974).  
Critically, however, the few experiments with mediated communication that did actually 
measure accuracy yielded inconsistent and at times contradictory results (for a review see Hastie, 
1986; Rowe & Wright, 1999). In the experiments, people are typically asked to complete numeric 
estimates before and after some form of group information exchange, allowing the researchers to 
assess the effect of communication on belief accuracy. Gustafson (1973) found that open 
discussion produced the most accurate estimates while the Delphi method produced the least 
accurate estimates, with independent individuals falling in the middle. Findings by Gough (1975; 
as cited by Hastie, 1986) also found that open discussion outperformed the Delphi method, but 
found that both methods outperformed independent judgements. Still others (Larreche & 
Moinpour, 1983) found that the Delphi method outperformed both independent individuals and 
unstructured discussion.  
There are several possible explanations for these inconsistencies. One possible explanation 
that must be considered is statistical error. In addition to the studies cited above, several researchers 
(Fisher, 1981; Boje & Murnighan, 1982; Snizek 1990) found no statistically significant difference 
between different modes of communication. Coupled with the fact that the analytic strategies 
varied considerably across those studies which did find results, increasing the possibility for Type 
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I error, this research as a whole may plausible be interpreted as a null result—i.e., that there is no 
effect of communication on belief accuracy under such controlled processes. However, we show 
instead that social influence does have intrinsic effects on belief accuracy, but that attempts to 
measure a “main effect” of social influence for any given form of communication produced 
inconsistent results due to unobserved heterogeneity across experimental tasks. 
Our attempt to revisit this question is motivated in part by more recent research (Almaatouq 
et al., 2020; Becker et al., 2017; Kao et al., 2018b; Lorenz et al., 2011) that has begun to implement 
these same methods again (estimate, mediated exchange, estimate) to study social influence, 
though with the increased control afforded by virtual laboratories. This research is also typically 
conducted with a different theoretical perspective (and often without reference) to earlier social 
psychological research on judgement and decision-making. Critically, these experiments have 
begun to identify ways in which mediated social influence can have systematic effects on belief 
accuracy by identifying hidden variables impacting communication and belief accuracy such as 
network structure. While these experiments don’t address the basic question of whether informal 
conversation is productive, they do provide a framework that can provide the answer. The present 
paper builds on this framework to answer a simple question: when a group sits down at a table to 
have a conversation, would they be better off communicating via numbers on a slip of paper? 
 
The Network Dynamics of Belief Formation 
Prior research on collective intelligence (Almaatouq et al., 2020; Becker et al., 2017) has identified 
two key principles relating social influence to belief formation, both of which build on a formal 
model of opinion formation developed by DeGroot (1974).  We note that the term “belief” is used 
in a variety of colloquial and scientific ways (Converse, 1962; Gawronski, 2012; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1975). From the perspective of strictly rational choice, as in e.g. game theory, a belief 
represents a probability distribution over a set of possible events that can be used to calculate which 
decision generates the maximum estimated payoff. Here, however, we are interested in beliefs 
more broadly as “what someone thinks about the world.” We don’t need to assume rational 
decision-makers to take an interest in quantitative beliefs, since people and organizations regularly 
make decisions based on beliefs about numbers, explicit or not, rational or not: expected return on 
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investment, how many units will sell, the revenue potential for a sales job candidate. While our 
theoretical interest is broadly in how people form and share beliefs, our analytic and empirical 
approach operationalizes beliefs as numeric estimates. We use the term “estimates” to refer to 
those specific numbers relevant to decisions, both in terms of what people think about the world 
and what they share with each other. This term is equivalent to ‘judgement’ (Brenner et al., 1996; 
Mannes, 2009) or ‘opinion’ (DeGroot, 1974; Hogarth, 1978) in other literature. Thus for our 
theoretical model and experimental results, we assume a person’s “belief” (about, e.g., the number 
of jellybeans in a jar) to be equivalent to their estimate and thus to be represented entirely by the 
number they provide. 
The DeGroot (1974) model assumes that each individual in a population starts with some 
initial opinion, i.e. a response to some numeric estimate. Each individual can then observe the 
beliefs of some or all other members of the population. Each individual then updates their belief 
as a weighted average, combining their own initial belief with the opinions of their peers. This 
weighting is completely flexible, in that it allows someone to ignore (or be disconnected) from 
some peers by assigning that peer a weight of zero, or to ignore social information all together, or 
to simply adopt the average. After updating, subjects then observe the revised belief of their peers 
and update again.  
The weight that each individual places on each of their peers can be represented as a social 
network, where the weight is a directed weighted edge between two people. This social network 
is a weighted influence network, indicating who influences whom and how much. DeGroot shows 
that if this revision process is repeated indefinitely, the group will asymptotically converge on a 
weighted average of initial independent beliefs, with each individual weighted proportionately to 
their centrality score in the corresponding influence network. In other words, centralized networks 
will be dominated by central individuals, but decentralized networks—where everyone has an 
equal centrality score—will converge on the initial group mean, thus preserving the wisdom of 
crowds. 
As Becker et al. (2017) argue, this property of belief formation means that centralized 
networks are inherently unreliable—the effect of social influence will depend only on the accuracy 
of the central node, generating the ‘wisdom of the few’ rather than the wisdom of the crowd. In 
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contrast, they observed a reliable increase in the accuracy of decentralized networks; instead of 
converging on the initial mean, they were drawn toward the belief of accurate individuals. This 
dynamic can be explained by noting that there are two ways for a person to gain centrality in the 
influence network. First, they can simply be more influential on their peers, e.g. through status or 
argumentation. Second, people can increase their centrality through stubbornness, which is 
operationalized by DeGroot as placing weight on one’s own self—thus giving oneself greater 
incoming network weight. And in Becker et al.’s experiment, subjects who were more accurate 
also appeared to be more stubborn. As a result, their networks which were decentralized by design 
ended up as weakly centralized network in which central individuals were reliably accurate. I.e., a 
decentralized communication network produced a centralized influence network. 
However, where Becker et al. (2017) characterized centralized communication networks 
as simply unpredictable and thus unreliable, Almaatouq et al. (2020) demonstrated that the effect 
centralized centralization depends on the statistical properties of the initial belief distribution. To 
explain this result intuitively, consider the conditions in Becker et al.: subjects are randomly 
assigned to a location in a ‘star’ network with one central node observed by all their peers. Assume, 
consistent with empirical data, that the overall movement of the group mean is relatively small 
compared to the overall distribution. Then after social influence, the group mean will have moved 
a relatively small amount in the direction of the central node. Thus, the probability that the group 
improves depends only on the probability that the central node is on the same side of the mean as 
the true answer.  
This analysis is an approximation: it is possible for the mean to “overshoot” the true 
answer, if a central node is in the right direction but also wildly inaccurate. However, Becker et 
al.’s analysis show that this approximation effectively characterizes empirical data—group 
outcomes can be predicted by whether or not the central node is in the relative direction of truth. 
Almaatouq et al. (2020) provide methods for calculating the exact probability of improvement as 
a function of the belief distribution and the relative influence of the central individual. Here we 
show that the intuitive approximation given above can be described formally as a limiting case of 
Almaatouq et al.’s analysis. We then use this formal demonstration to generate testable hypotheses 
relating unstructured discussion to numeric exchange.   
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Assume for simplicity (following Almaatouq et al., 2020) a network with one high influence 
individual (with belief H) and N-1 equally low influence individuals (with mean belief ?̅?). Let 𝜃 
be the true answer. Assume also (again following Almaatouq et al.) some belief updating process 
(e.g. discussion) such that the mean belief after communication can be calculated as a weighted 
mean, 𝜇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶𝐻 + (1 − 𝐶)?̅? where C represents the centrality
3 of the high influence individual, 
which in DeGroot (1974) would be a weight proportional to network centrality. Let 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒 be the 
pre-communication belief, and note that 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
1
𝑁
𝐻 +  𝑁−1
𝑁
?̅? . Thus when 𝐶 = 1
𝑁
, everybody is 
equally influential, and when 𝐶 = 1, the group simply adopts the high influence individual’s 
belief. Assume that 𝐶 ≥ 1
𝑁
.  
Define “group error” as the distance between the mean belief and the true answer, i.e. 
|𝜇 − 𝜃| where 𝜃 is the true answer. Note that, as observed by Becker et al., (2017), there are two 
primary cases of interest—when H and 𝜃 are on the same side of 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒, meaning that H is in the 
direction of truth relative to 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒; and when H and 𝜃 are on opposite sides 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒. When H is on the 
opposite side from truth, the group error will increase. When H is on the same side as truth, then 
group error will decrease, i.e. the group will become more accurate, as long as 𝜇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒 <
 2(𝜃 − 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒). Note that the right side of the equation is independent of C, and the left side equals 
0 when C=0 and increases in magnitude monotonically as C increases. In the case where 
𝐻 − 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒 <  2(𝜃 − 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒) , i.e. where the central individual is relatively accurate, then 
communication will increase group accuracy regardless of the value of C. In contrast, when 
 
 
3 Almaatouq et al. (2020) present a slightly rearranged version of the weighted sum in their equation S.5: 𝜇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
𝜔𝐻 + (1 − 𝜔)(𝐻
𝑁
+ 𝐿)̅̅ ̅ . 𝜔 represents a form of network centralization, a measurement of the overall inequality in 
influence which we measure below as the Gini coefficient. Our measurement of network centrality, the influence of a 
single individual, is equivalent in this case as 𝐶 = 1
𝑁
+ 𝑁−1
𝑁
𝜔 . We make this rearrangement of terms in order to 
represent the post-influence estimate as a weighted sum of H and L. 
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𝐻 − 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒 >  2(𝜃 − 𝜇𝑝𝑟𝑒), the central individual is in the direction of the truth but also very 
inaccurate relative to the group as a whole. In such a case, a highly influential H may cause the 
group to “overshoot” the true value so far that it initially moves towards the true value but then 
moves past the true value and the group ultimately ends up less accurate than it started. This will 
occur for example when C=1, and the group simply adopts the central individual’s belief. More 
generally, there is some value 𝐶′ such that for all 𝐶′ ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 1 the group mean will be less accurate. 
Importantly, this also means that for all 𝐶 ≤ 𝐶′ the group will, despite being influenced by such a 
highly inaccurate individual, nonetheless improves by sheer chance. 
Assume, then, that this is always the case: either H is on the opposite side of truth, and the 
group becomes less accurate; or H is on the same side of truth, and 𝐶 ≤ 𝐶′, and thus the group 
becomes more accurate. Note that even in experimental settings using where an individual is given 
highly centralized position in a binary communication network, they may nonetheless hold 
relatively low C in the weighted influence network (e.g., if people ignore the central node and 
don’t revise, or make relatively small revisions). This assumption is thus consistent with the 
behavior of such “star networks” in previous experiments on numeric exchange, i.e. with one 
highly centralized individual, in which groups did not simply adopt the belief of the central 
individual but yet moved a relatively small amount in the direction of their belief (Becker et al., 
2017). 
Finally, let φ indicate the proportion of individuals in any population whose initial belief 
is on the same side of the mean as the true answer, as shown in the conceptual diagram in Figure 
1. Then, φ represents the probability that any randomly selected individual will hold a belief on 
the truth side of the mean. If we further assume that network centrality (influence) is uncorrelated 
with belief (a point we will empirically assess later) then φ equals the probability that H is on the 
truth side of the mean and thus that communication in a centralized network will increase accuracy. 
This analysis yields a simple empirical heuristic. Centralized networks will improve in expectation 
when φ>0.5, and become less accurate when φ<0.5. We note that this heuristic, which we formally 
derive here, is conceptually similar to empirical analyses of centralized networks in lab 
experiments (Becker et al, 2017). Importantly, this model is not intended as a precise theoretical 
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description of human behavior, but rather is an approximation intended to provide an intuitive but 
formal motivation for our use of φ as an empirical heuristic. 
Using this framework, we can explain the dynamics of numeric exchange versus 
unstructured discussion. While numeric exchange does let people can obtain some variation in 
influence through stubbornness, this level of influence is inherently limited. In contrast, 
unstructured discussion allows people the opportunity to directly sway each other’s beliefs, 
allowing any individual potentially unlimited influence over group opinion. Thus while both 
communication formats can be characterized as demonstrating emergent centralization (even in 
otherwise decentralized networks), the potential degree of centralization is much greater for 
unstructured discussion. Unstructured discussion can, in theory, reach maximal centralization (one 
person dictating group beliefs). As a result, the effect of initial belief distribution—which depends 
on centralization—will be much stronger for unstructured discussion than for numeric exchange. 
Moreover, because the centralization (stubbornness) in numeric exchange may be correlated with 
accuracy, this mild centralization in numeric exchange may be generally beneficial. 
Taken together, these observations can explain the apparent contradiction in previous 
experimental findings. Assume that for some group, numeric exchange has a fixed probability ω 
of generating increased accuracy. If an experiment happens to be conducted with estimation tasks 
that yield initial belief distributions with φ<ω, then unstructured discussion can be expected to 
decrease accuracy while numeric exchange increases accuracy; and vice versa when φ>ω. Because 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram showing the calculation for φ, or the proportion of individuals on 
the truth side of the mean. We find that φ is a useful heuristic for predicting the effect of group 
discussion. 
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previous studies have reported such conflicting results on whether social influence improves 
accuracy, we assume ω≈1/2. Based on this theoretical perspective, we will test the following pre-
registered hypotheses: 
 
H1: In a logistic regression, φ will predict the probability of improvement for both 
unstructured discussion and numeric exchange. 
 
H2a: The effect of φ will be greater for unstructured discussion than for numeric exchange. 
 
H2b: Unstructured discussion will outperform numeric exchange when φ>1/2, and vice 
versa when φ<1/2. 
 
H3: In unstructured discussion, the effect of φ will be greater for groups with higher 
centralization scores. 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODS 
We first tested these hypotheses on publicly available data from previous experiments (Becker et 
al., 2017, 2019; Gürçay et al., 2015; Lorenz et al., 2011). While 1 experiment tested unstructured 
discussion, and 3 experiments tested numeric exchange, no data available to us tested both numeric 
exchange and discussion. As a result, this analysis compares both across experimental procedures 
as well as across question content, thus limiting the validity of causal inference in comparing the 
two types of communication. In order to test the robustness of our initial findings, we used this 
initial data to conduct statistical power tests and generate hypotheses for a pre-registered 
replication experiment to directly compare numeric exchange with unstructured communication. 
In this second experiment, we also pre-tested tasks to ensure that our experimental trials included 
a wide range for φ. Overall, the goal of this analysis is to identify potential heterogeneity in the 
effect of social influence that may have been overlooked in previous research. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of trials by φ for both sets of experiments. 
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Reanalysis 
To illustrate the explanatory power of this theory, this paper presents a reanalysis of data from 
previous experiments that measured belief accuracy in groups before and after interaction. This 
reanalysis tests for the effects of emergent network centralization. This analysis uses four 
previously published studies (Becker et al., 2017, 2019; Gürçay et al., 2015; Lorenz et al., 2011). 
These datasets were all made publicly available through the initial publications. 
 Detailed methods can be found in the initial publications, and each study follows a similar 
procedure. Subjects were asked to complete estimation tasks (e.g. visual estimation, trivia 
questions, and political facts) before and after exchanging information via a computer mediated 
communication process. An example of visual estimation task is an image of a jar of gumballs 
where subjects are asked to estimate how many gumballs are in the jar. An example of a trivia 
question is estimating the length of the border of Switzerland. An example of a political fact is 
asking subjects to estimate the number of undocumented immigrants living in the United States. 
In three of the studies (Lorenz et al, 2011; Becker et al, 2017; Becker et al, 2019) subjects only 
exchanged numeric estimates. These studies therefore represent a method equivalent to a digitally 
mediated version of the Delphi method. Lorenz et al. (2011) allowed 5 rounds of revision (1 
independent estimate and 4 socially influenced estimates) while Becker et al. (2017; 2019) allowed 
3 rounds of revision (1 independent estimate and 2 socially influenced estimates). In contrast, 
Gürçay et al allowed subjects to engage in continuous, unstructured discussion via a computer chat 
interface, so that subjects provided only two answers, a pre-discussion and a post-discussion 
estimate (1 independent estimate and 1 socially influenced estimate).  The data from Gürçay et al. 
 Reanalysis Replication 
Toward 63% 49.5% 
Away 29% 46.5% 
Split 8% 4% 
   
 
Table 1. The distribution of trials by the majority opinion as measured by φ.  While the data in 
previous experimental trials was heavily skewed toward a majority-correct task set, our replication 
experiment successfully produced a mixed balance of outcomes for φ. 
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is missing chat transcripts from 5 groups, and therefore those trials are omitted from analyses 
where the chat transcripts are necessary (i.e., measuring emergent centralization). 
 
Replication Study 
Our replication study follows the same general research paradigm as previous experiments, with 
two key design features. First, we pre-tested questions to ensure that our tasks covered a wide 
range of φ, in order to identify heterogeneity that may have been overlooked in previous research 
comparing unstructured discussion and numeric exchange. Second, our design allows for direct 
comparison between unstructured discussion and numeric (Delphi) exchange, where previous 
studies in our dataset only allowed either one or the other. Following previous research, subjects 
first provided an initial independent estimate for a numeric estimation task, then engaged in social 
information exchange, and then provided a final estimate. Subjects were paid based on their 
accuracy.  A complete list of questions is provided in the Appendix. 
 Subjects were recruited from a panel of 21,000 Amazon Mechanical Turk members 
maintained for a virtual behavioral laboratory at the host institution.  Prior to the beginning of the 
experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to be recruited either to unstructured discussion 
groups or Delphi groups. This method allowed us to run the two experiments in parallel while 
maintaining random assignment to conditions. Subjects were recruited in batches by sending an 
email with a link to access the experimental website. All subjects who arrived at the website at for 
a given experimental session were randomly assigned to a group of 20 individuals. If the number 
of subjects who arrived at the page was not divisible by 20 (e.g., if 59 subjects arrived) individuals 
would be randomly assigned either to participate or not. Subjects who were not assigned to a group 
were returned to the pool and invited at a later time. 
 For unstructured discussion, subjects were given 60 seconds to read the question and 
provide their initial estimate. They were then placed into a chatroom with the other subjects in 
their group and given 3 minutes to discuss the question. After this period, subjects were given 30 
seconds to provide their final answer. At each stage, a countdown timer indicated the time 
remaining for that stage. 
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 For numeric (Delphi) exchange, subjects were given 60 seconds to read the question and 
provide their initial estimate. Subjects were then shown a list of the answers provided by other 
subjects in their group as well as the average of answers provided by other subjects. Answers were 
randomized for each subject, so that each subject saw answers in a different order. Subjects were 
given 60 seconds to review the responses of other subjects and provide an updated (second) 
estimate. This process was then repeated, allowing subjects to respond to the revised answers of 
their peers and provide a third estimate. Finally, subjects were shown the revised answers of their 
peers and given 30 seconds to provide a final answer. At each stage, a countdown timer indicated 
the time remaining for that stage. 
By this method, subjects in each condition had 60 seconds to provide an initial estimate, 3 minutes 
to respond to the estimates of their peers, and 30 seconds to provide a final answer. In total, we 
collected 10 trials (i.e., 10 groups of 20 individuals) each for 10 unique questions for each 
condition, producing a total of 100 trials of unstructured discussion and 100 trials of Delphi 
exchange. In total, we collected data from 4,000 unique subjects. This pre-registered sample size 
was based on power tests using the re-analysis of previous data to achieve 80% power on our main 
hypothesis. 
 
Analysis 
For the purposes of our analysis, a single experimental consists of a single group of individuals 
completing a single estimation task. For each experimental trial, we ask a simple question: after 
social influence, was the mean estimate more accurate, i.e. closer to the true answer? Our primary 
outcome of interest, for any given experimental condition, is the proportion of trials in which the 
average answer became more accurate. We assess these outcomes using one- and two-sample 
proportion tests as well as logistic regression. For our pre-registered reanalysis of previously 
published data, we used cluster-robust logistic regression with fixed effects intercepts due to the 
structure of the data, since each recruited group answered multiple questions (i.e., completed 
multiple trials). For previously published data on numeric exchange, we combined all the data and 
analyzed it as if collected in a single experiment, clustering on dataset as well as groups within 
each dataset. In order to test the hypothesis that the effect of φ is moderated by centralization, we 
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measure centrality for each individual in the discussion groups as the number of chat messages 
they sent. We measure network centralization as the Gini coefficient on centrality scores (Badham, 
2013). 
The analysis presented here differs slightly from our pre-registered analysis in order to 
simplify the presentation of results, improve robustness, and report additional tests of interest. We 
report the deviations in the Appendix along with full details for the pre-registered analysis. We 
find comparable results for both our reanalysis of previous data as well as our replication analysis, 
and therefore present the results of both analyses simultaneously. Our pre-registered analysis 
included hypothesis tests but did not specify specific “statistical significance” cut-offs and we 
instead report all relevant tests and the accompanying statistical certainty of those tests. 
 
RESULTS 
The primary question facing many prior researchers, for any given communication format, is 
simply “does this process increase belief accuracy?” We therefore begin our analysis testing 
whether there is a main effect of social influence for each condition in each dataset. However, we 
do not find any consistent pattern. In our reanalysis, we found that social influence increased 
accuracy for a majority of trials in both numeric exchange (61% improvement, P<0.001, χ2=14.6) 
and unstructured discussion (55% improvement, P=0.11, χ2=2.54). In our replication, numeric 
exchange instead decreased accuracy in a majority of trials (45% improvement, P=0.37, χ2=0.81) 
 
Figure 2. The probability that unstructured discussion will improve belief accuracy depends on 
the majority opinion relative to the initial mean and the true value, i.e. whether or not φ<½. In 
contrast, φ has a minimal effect on numeric exchange, with results varying across datasets but not 
substantially varying within datasets. 
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while discussion again increased accuracy (54% improvement, P=0.48, χ2=0.49). These results are 
consistent with the contradictory results of previous literature, and consistent with our expectation 
that social influence does not have a single main effect on belief accuracy. 
We next test the hypothesis that the effect of social influence is determined by the initial 
belief distribution. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the effect of φ on the probability that social 
influence improves belief accuracy. Our pre-registered analysis consists of a logistic regression 
predicting the binary outcome “did error decrease” as a function of φ. In both the re-analysis and 
the replication analysis, we found that the probability of improvement increases with φ for both 
discussion and numeric exchange (P<=0.01, all four tests, table S1). This analysis shows that the 
effect of social influence is determined by the initial belief distribution but does not yet explain 
the inconsistent comparisons of numeric exchange and unstructured discussion. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis that the effect of initial belief distribution is magnified by 
network centralization, we find that the effect of φ is greater for unstructured discussion than for 
numeric exchange. Following our pre-registered analysis plan, Figure 2 shows the probability of 
improvement as a function of the majority opinion by dividing outcomes based on whether φ > 1
2
 
(majority correct) or φ < 1
2
 (majority incorrect). For unstructured discussion, the initial belief 
distribution determined whether information exchange helped or harmed accuracy. In discussion 
trials, the majority opinion significantly predicted outcomes (P<0.01 both datasets, proportion 
test): when φ > 1
2
, discussion increased accuracy in 66% of reanalysis trials and 69% of replication 
trials, but when φ < 1
2
 discussion increased accuracy in only 36% and 40% of trials, respectively. 
In contrast, the majority opinion has a negligible effect on improvement for numeric exchange 
(P>0.44, both datasets, proportion test). While the two datasets disagreed regarding the main effect 
of numeric exchange (suggesting no main effect at all), the location of the majority opinion did 
not tip the scales for numeric exchange in either sets of trials. Most importantly, Figure 2 shows 
how previous experiments could at times yield conflicting results: when the majority is away from 
truth, numeric exchange improves accuracy more than discussion (P<0.01, reanalysis; P=0.82, 
replication; χ2=7.8, 0.05); when the majority is toward truth, discussion is superior (P=0.59, 
reanalysis; P=0.06, replication; χ2=0.3, 3.4).  We note that while these two-sample tests are not 
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statistically clear in every case, the overall effect is consistent across replication:  when φ > 1
2
, the 
probability of improvement in discussion is greater than numeric exchange for all cases, and vice 
versa when φ < 1
2
. 
We note that these empirical analyses so far, regardless of the underlying mechanisms, are 
sufficient in principle to explain prior results. However, we further hypothesize that this variation 
is driven by emergent centralization in discussion networks, which amplifies the effects of initial 
distribution. To measure emergent centralization in unstructured discussion, we calculate the Gini 
coefficient on individual contribution as measured by the number of chat messages sent. We then 
test for an interaction between centralization and φ in a logistic regression, finding results that are 
statistically uncertain but in the correct direction for both our reanalysis and our replication. The 
effect of φ gets stronger as centralization increases for both our reanalysis and our replication trials 
(P=0.31, 0.32 respectively; see Table A3). 
 As an additional exploratory test for the effect of centralization, we also estimate the extent 
to which the most talkative (central) person in each group predicts group outcomes, as shown in 
Figure 3. To measure this, we determine for each discussion trial who the most talkative person is, 
and whether their initial estimate is in the direction of truth. We then measure whether groups are 
more likely to improve when the most talkative (central) individual is initially in the correct 
direction compared to the group mean. We find for both reanalysis and replication that discussion 
 
Figure 3. The initial belief of the most talkative person relative to the initial mean and the true 
answer—i.e., whether they are in the direction of truth or not—determines the effect of 
unstructured discussion on group accuracy. 
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is significantly more likely to improve group accuracy when the most talkative person is in the 
correct direction (P<0.01, both analyses, proportion test). Finally, we also test whether individuals 
who are more initially accurate are likely to be more talkative. To compare across tasks with 
different error ranges, we convert each person’s error and talkativeness into quartiles4 grouped by 
task (for error) and dataset (for talkativeness). We then measure the correlation between these two 
values (using cluster-robust regression as above for the re-analysis, clustering data by trial) finding 
a near-zero correlation between talkativeness and accuracy for both datasets (-0.01, P>0.64 for the 
reanalysis, 0.05, P>0.06 for our replication). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our results offer an explanation for why prior research sometimes showed that mediated processes 
improved group belief accuracy over unstructured discussion, and sometimes showed the opposite. 
We show through both re-analysis and a novel pre-registered experiment that unstructured 
discussion will sometimes increase group accuracy and sometimes decrease accuracy, depending 
on φ, i.e. the proportion of individuals on the true side of the mean. In contrast, numeric exchange 
is only minimally (if at all) impacted by φ. As a result unstructured discussion sometimes 
outperforms numeric exchange and sometimes numeric exchange is optimal. We note that one 
simplifying interpretation of this dynamic would be to call it a “majority effect,” due to the 
tendency for the statistical majority to predict outcomes. However, our results display a critical 
paradox: while collectively groups are drawn—on average—to the majority as represented by the 
median belief, each individual group is drawn not to the majority for that group but to the most 
central individual. In this way, the dynamic we describe differs fundamentally from majority rules 
models as in e.g. polarization (Sunstein, 2006). 
 Because these results depend on variation in the statistical properties of the pre-discussion 
belief distribution, another way of interpreting these results is that the relative optimality of 
discussion or numeric exchange depends on the estimation task in which the group is engaging. 
 
 
4 Due to the relatively small group size, bins smaller than quartiles were not possible for all trials. 
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We note, for example, research on such simple estimation tasks as counting (e.g., jellybeans in a 
jar) that belief distributions for similar classes of estimation task yield similar and reliably 
predictable shapes (Kao et al., 2018a). Thus for a group that may regularly need to complete the 
same class of estimation tasks routinely (e.g., estimating the success of an advertising campaign, 
a problem notoriously resilient to statistical aggregation [Hartnett et al., 2016]) it may even be 
possible to calibrate group behavior, and choose an appropriate communication strategy, based on 
long term feedback. For cases where this is not possible, or where highly mediated numeric 
exchange is infeasible or undesirable, our theoretical perspective offers additional possibilities. 
In addition to resolving contradictions in previous findings, our results also show how 
network theoretical results can help to explain belief formation in otherwise unstructured 
communication such as committee discussion or board meetings. While prior empirical analyses 
on belief accuracy (Almaatouq et al., 2020; Becker et al., 2017) emphasized a binary network 
model focused on the pattern of who could communicate with whom—as would be important to 
studying, e.g., organizational structure—we find that emergent networks of influence can shape 
dynamics in the same way as explicit communication networks. While the networks in our analyses 
were spontaneous, emerging from the independent characteristics of anonymous strangers, 
communication in practice is likely shaped by many pre-existing patterns such as status relations, 
claims to expertise, and prior social ties. As a result, we expect that future research will find that 
traditional methods in organizational network research may have additional use in explaining the 
relative optimality of decision-making by different teams and groups.  
 
Limitations 
One clear limitation of this analysis is that our results are relatively uncertain from a statistical 
perspective. Results are relatively clear for our main hypothesis regarding the differential effect of 
φ on discussion versus numeric exchange. The dynamics of unstructured discussion show a strong 
effect of φ consistent across both our reanalysis and our replication, and numeric exchange varies 
in the main effect of social influence but nonetheless shows a consistent and relatively weak 
moderating effect of φ. However, our attempt to directly measure the hypothesized mechanism, 
emergent centrality, generated statistically uncertain results. Specifically, we did not see a strong 
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interaction effect between φ and centralization as measured by the Gini coefficient on 
talkativeness. However, we do note that the effects were in the expected direction, and were again 
consistent across both our reanalysis and our replication. Thus, results are at the very least 
consistent with our theory and hypothesis. Moreover, we note that our additional analysis showed 
that the belief of central (talkative) individuals are highly predictive of group outcomes. Most 
importantly, our observation that outcomes depend on φ, as shown in Figure 2, is minimally 
sufficient to explain contradictions in previous research. Additional research may be warranted to 
further identify the dynamics of centralization in group communication. 
 The biggest challenge facing our research is the limited ability to drawn generalizable 
conclusions outside of the laboratory. In particular, our reliance on networks of anonymous 
strangers makes it difficult to generalize to organizational settings where people interact within the 
context of previously established networks. One limitation in this respect is that we measured only 
one type of centrality, talkativeness, and while influence networks in practice will be determined 
by mechanisms such as group norms and status relations. On the one hand, this limitation suggests 
that our results may have underestimated the true effects of emergent networks, as group dynamics 
such as status and norms may operate more strongly and deeply than factors affecting the 
interaction of anonymous strangers. As a result, we may reach a fairly reliable conclusion that 
unstructured discussion in organizational settings acts like centralized networks, and that the effect 
on accuracy is likely to vary widely by task. However, this limitation also means additional 
research is needed to understand the extent to which these dynamics are predictable and thus what 
may be optimal strategy in any given situation. 
 
Conclusion  
In the simple context of our experimental design, a network theoretical perspective may seem like 
methodological overkill—as described in our theoretical analysis, the dynamic of centralized 
networks can be approximated by a simple weighted combination of high and low influence 
contributors. Thus, although the theoretical model and predictions presented here may have 
emerged from the literature of network scholarship, the details of the models are not necessary for 
solving the specific problem posed presented here. However, we do wish to close by observing 
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that the flexibility of this model means that future research can develop more complex approaches 
while maintaining theoretical compatibility with the paradigm presented here and thus earlier 
research on the Delphi method and related work. This flexibility will be especially important when 
accounting for sources of influence, such as status, that are not reflected in the laboratory 
conditions we study. We hope that this theoretical approach will help to draw a bridge between 
the laboratory results on belief accuracy and organizational communication in practice. 
This theoretical approach also points the way to a possible communication strategy that 
can mitigate the variability we observe in unstructured discussion. Suppose that numeric exchange 
or other carefully mediated communication processes are, for some normative or operational 
reason, infeasible or undesirable. This limitation may occur if, for example, people need to share 
complex information that cannot be transmitted by numbers alone. This limitation may also occur 
when already have exchanged information informally, e.g. if a process of sensemaking (Weick et 
al., 2005) where a problem is defined occurs prior to the formal decision. In such a case, network 
structure may provide a solution. By embedding individuals in small interaction groups with just 
a handful of members, a group may maintain overall connectivity via overlapping group 
membership while nonetheless limiting the ability for any one individual to become overly central. 
Both theoretical hypotheses and analysis of such a strategy would require the more flexible model 
presented here. 
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APPENDIX 
Replication code and data for all analyses presented in this paper are available at:  
• https://github.com/joshua-a-becker/emergent-network-structure 
 
Pre-registration available at: 
• https://osf.io/9xq2j  
 
Departure from Pre-registered Analysis 
The pre-registered tests for the finding shown in Figure 2 included a series of descriptive one-
sample and two-sample proportion tests for the probability of improvement for each point in the 
figure. However, to simplify the readability of our manuscript, we focus the main text on more 
central tests and include only the two-sample proportion tests for each line in Figure 2. Here we 
present the full pre-registered descriptive analysis. Table A1 presents a series of one-sample 
proportion tests, asking at each point in the parameter space whether social influence significantly 
improves (or decreases) group error.  
 The main text also reports a slightly modified version of our test for an interaction effect 
between φ and talkativeness centralization. Our pre-registered analysis only calculated the Gini 
coefficient for participants present in the discussion, which incorrectly omitted zeros from the 
calculation—i.e., people who did not contribute to discussion (and thus had minimal influence) 
Majority 
Relative 
to Truth Format Replication 
% 
Improved P.val 
Away Delphi reanalysis 0.584 0.171 
Away Delphi replication 0.44 0.480 
Away Discussion reanalysis 0.363 0.008 
Away Discussion replication 0.395 0.222 
Toward Delphi reanalysis 0.629 0.000 
Toward Delphi replication 0.489 1.000 
Toward Discussion reanalysis 0.661 0.000 
Toward Discussion replication 0.692 0.008  
 
Table A1. Pre-registered proportion tests. Each row represents a one-sample proportion test for a 
different part of the parameter space. 
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but nonetheless contributed to the collective belief by including an opinion. We note that while 
this test was statistically significant in its original version, it is not significant in the revised version. 
We provide code for both tests in our replication materials.  
 
Supplemental Analysis 
Table A2 shows the regression results for the effect of Phi. Table A3 shows the regression results 
for an interaction between phi and centralization as measured by Gini coefficient. 
 
Replication Question Text 
Crowdfunding 1. Consider this crowdfunding campaign: The goal of this app is to promote new 
music discovery in a fun and different way. This app would allow musicians to “drop” songs at 
specific physical locations. Anyone using the app would then be able to listen to the song by 
visiting that location. The app sought £30,000 (British pounds) and offered funders equity in the 
company, with a total equity of 35% for the whole campaign. How much money do you think the 
campaign raised? Answer: 30,000. Source: https://www.seedrs.com/gigdropper 
 
Crowdfunding 2. Consider this crowdfunding campaign: The product is headphones designed for 
dance music. The goal of the product is to replicate the sound style of being in a club or party. The 
campaign followed a successful prior round of funding, and the company has already sold 
 
Table A2. Regression results showing effect of phi on probability that the error of the mean belief 
(absolute deviation) decreases. 
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thousands of units. This campaign sought an additional £100,000 (British pounds) in exchange for 
equity in the company, and ended up exceeding their goals. How much money do you think the 
campaign raised? Answer: 142,770. Source: https://www.seedrs.com/pump-audio  
 
Socio-Economic 1:  In 2009, approximately 690 million passengers boarded a plane. (So a round-
trip flight counts for 2 passengers boarding.)  How many of these passengers boarded out of an 
airport in the New York City area (JFK, La Guardia, and Newark)? (Give your answer in 
millions—e.g., enter 1 for 1 million.) Answer: 41. Source: http://infochimps.org/datasets/d35-
million-us-domestic-flights-from-1990-to-2009  
 
Socio-Economic 2: Across all colleges where the US Department of Education collected data, the 
average tuition revenue per full time (or equivalent) student was $10,438 per year. In terms of 
dollars, how much money do you think was spent on instruction, per student? Answer: 7912. 
Source: https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/data/ 
 
Art 1: [display image of Planteuse des Betteraves] This drawing by Vincent Van Gogh sold at 
auction in May, 2018. It is 18 inches tall by 20 inches wide, charcoal on paper. How much did it 
sell for? (Answer in millions of dollars, e.g. enter 1 for $1 million or 0.5 for $500,000) Answer: 
 
Table A3. Regression results showing interaction effect between phi and centralization (Gini 
coefficient) on probability that the error of the mean belief (absolute deviation) decreases. 
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$3.6 million. Source: https://www.christies.com/lotfinder/Lot/vincent-van-gogh-1853-1890-
planteuse-de-betteraves-6134215-details.aspx 
 
Art 2: [Image of La Lampe] This painting by Pablo Picasso sold at auction in November, 2018. It 
is 64 inches tall by 51 inches wide, oil on canvas. How much did it sell for? (Answer in millions 
of dollars, e.g. enter 1 for $1 million or 0.5 for $500,000). Answer: $29.6 million. Source: 
https://www.christies.com/lotfinder/Lot/pablo-picasso-1881-1973-la-lampe-6169488-
details.aspx 
 
Geopolitics 1: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) is a non-
governmental organization that tracks violent conflict in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. One 
type of event they track is those where civilians were intentionally targeted. In 2018, they recorded 
841 such events in Somalia. How many of this type of event do you think they recorded in Yemen 
for 2018? Answer: 609. Source: https://www.acleddata.com/data/ 
 
Geopolitics 2: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) is a non-
governmental organization that tracks violent conflict in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. One 
type of event they track is those where civilians were intentionally targeted. In 2018, they recorded 
841 such events in Somalia. How many of this type of event do you think they recorded in Syria 
for 2018? Answer: 1501. Source: https://www.acleddata.com/data/ 
 
Gun Violence 1: Gun Violence Archive (GVA) is a not for profit corporation that tracks gun-
related violence in the United States. In 2018, GVA recorded 1,113 events in Baltimore. (A single 
event might involve more than 1 person.) How many events do you think they recorded in Chicago 
in 2018? Answer: 2812. Source: https://github.com/awesomedata/awesome-public-datasets# 
socialsciences 
 
Gun Violence 2: Gun Violence Archive (GVA) is a not for profit corporation that tracks gun-
related violence in the United States. In 2018, GVA recorded 1,113 events in Baltimore. (A single 
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event might involve more than 1 person.) How many do you think they recorded in Philadelphia 
in 2018? Answer: 570. Source: https://github.com/awesomedata/awesome-public-datasets 
#socialsciences 
